Greg Detre
6/11/01
strong behaviourism � can't cope with the holism of the mental, or its inner reality
functionalism � ignores qualia
are there rich enough causal roles?
Davidsonian � what�s constitutive of the mental is rationality, not causal roles
it�s a 3rd person priority theory
it�s not so easy to account for non-inferential access to mental states
describe behaviour � purely physical vs actions (imply mentality)
reductive vs intentional descriptions
how can dispositional beliefs (i.e. ones you�ve never thought of until then) have causal roles?
rational/causal/normative relations � can they be aligned/made compatible?
how do you delineate a type???
does Rolls� dot product idea work for diluted connectivity???
y, because the synaptic weights can be 0